Sunday 13th April 2014 Vietnam: The Tragic Legacy Of The Great Barrier Minefield

On the coach back from Long Tan we watched a video about the Barrier Minefield, a tragic tactical blunder with a horrible legacy.

On 1 January 1967 Major General Stuart Clarence Graham AO, DSO, OBE, MC (1920 – 1996) was appointed Commander 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) which was based in Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam, taking over from Brigadier David Jackson.  During February 1967 1 ATF had sustained its heaviest casualties in the war to that point, losing 16 men killed and 55 wounded in a single week, the majority after 6 RAR had clashed with two companies from the Viet Cong D445 Battalion reinforced by North Vietnamese regulars, north-west of Hoi My on 17 February. To Graham such losses underscored the need for a third infantry battalion and tanks but since the Australian government were unable to provide additional military resources at that time, it confirmed in his mind the need to establish a physical barrier to deny the Viet Cong freedom of movement.  Graham subsequently established an 11-kilometre (6.8 mi) long barrier minefield from Dat Do to the coast during Operation Leeton (6 March – 1 June) in an attempt to regain the initiative.

According to Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins, the official historians of Australian involvement in the Vietnam War http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuart_Clarence_Graham

whilst largely forced by the inadequate forces available and the inherent contradictions of Australian strategic policy, Graham’s decision was contrary to the advice of a number of his senior officers and in particular Lieutenant Colonel John Warr, commanding officer 5 RAR, who had served in the Korean War, where the Australians had suffered a large number of casualties from mines originally laid by other UN forces.  As an Armoured Corps officer Graham had not served in Korea, and many of the assumptions he developed about mine warfare in North Africa, therefore, remained unchallenged.  

McNeill & Ekins report that for the first six months the barrier minefield resulted in a dramatic decline in Viet Cong infiltration, reducing re-supply movement by up to 80 per cent. However, the Viet Cong soon begun attempting to penetrate it, cutting gaps in the fence and clearing lanes through the minefield to restore the flow of supplies, as well as lifting mines for their own use.  Although designed to hinder the movement of the Viet Cong between their jungle bases and the villages on which they relied for supplies, the failure of South Vietnamese forces to protect the barrier minefield ultimately allowed the Viet Cong to remove thousands of mines, many of which were subsequently used against 1 ATF.  As casualties continued to grow, the decision was eventually made to remove it to prevent the Viet Cong from using the minefield as a source of munitions.